FROM POLICY TO STRATEGY:
The Quest for a Real National Security Strategy in the Philippines

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Introduction

National security is a paramount principle enshrined as a matter of policy in the constitution of any sovereign and independent state. The primacy of this state policy is incontrovertible, especially for peoples with self-righteous identity, deep-seated values, rich resource base, and determined sense of national purpose.

In a paper on "Perspective on National Security Policy Framing" (2015), I defined *national security* as a guarantee that the sovereignty, territory, citizens, constitutional values, and acquired gains of a nation-state are protected, promoted, and defended.[1] Such guarantee is sought as a policy goal that guides how the state shall undertake strategic courses of action to secure its *national interests* or, by definition, the things that matter most to the survival and success of a nation-state.

The policy-orientedness of the subject of national security must be understood in order to get to thoughtful conversations on strategy. More than the rhetoric, it is the logic and "strategic grammar"[2] that speak of the real nature and structure of a national security policy. An effective communication of a policy on national security articulates clearly what the state intends to do and in what direction it should head, based on its culture and conviction, to promote and protect its core interests. The policy communication also states strategically how

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[1] See Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase, "Perspective on National Security Policy Framing: Public Safety as Component Policy of National Security," Philippine Public Safety Review Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015).

[2] The call for crafting "a new strategic grammar" to develop a culture of strategic thinking across the military and civilian bureaucracies in the United Kingdom (UK) was asserted by Paul Newton, Paul Colley, and Andrew Sharpe in their article on "Reclaiming the Art of British Strategic Thinking" in The RUSI Journal Vol. 155, No. 1 (March 2010).

the state can develop its resources, muster its forces, and use its power bases to get to its desired end-state.[3]

In this article, I intend to continue the discourse on national security policymaking by steering the academic discussions on policy in the critical direction of strategy. Building on my previous critiques and studies on national security policy in the Philippines, this article endeavors an exposition of the link between policy and strategy, which appears to be unstudied by policymakers on national security in the country.

Deficiency in the knowledge base on national security policy and strategy results in scattered and mixed-up socio-economic goals as the ends by themselves of a political leadership with a fixed term. This is the case when the policy label of national security is tagged on the execution of the basic functions of government, which makes a security policy non-strategic and problematic both in theory and practice. A deficient understanding of the real meaning and setting of national security policy obscures the focus on strategic imperatives which make such policy a matter of high priority, supposedly.

To address the knowledge gap in national security policy making, I will discuss in this paper the conceptual foundations of policy and strategy. The intellectual underpinnings of these terms are the building blocks of constructing national security in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous times. From a viewpoint of *constructive realism*,[4] I will attempt to structuralize idealist policy constructs on national security by defining the strategic agenda for Philippine security in the next administration and beyond.

To note, *constructivism* and *realism* are the two schools of thought that profess differing values and views on what is to be done in policy to realize the goal of security.[5]

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[3] In the article on "Perspective on National Security Policy Framing," I discussed that national security is communicated in the language of policy and strategy, and that the policy communication holds the key constructs or variables that constitute the framework for national security. [Almase, pp. 28-29.]

[4] *Constructive realism* is in line with what I coined or labelled as *social-institutionalist* paradigm in my typology of "Cross-Paradigmatic Approaches in Policy and Security Studies." I defined a *social-institutionalist study* as a mix of constructivist and realist assumptions and propositions in making sense of social realities and giving order to society through institutions and regulations. In this regard, I characterized my previous article on "Perspective on National Security Policy Framing" as *social-institutionalist* because of the intention to institutionalize a socially constructed meaning of national security in the form of a policy or a course of action by the political administration. [Almase, pp. 22 & 29.]

[5] From a review of the academic literature in International Relations, of which Security Studies is a sub-discipline, the constructivists are also referred to as the idealists and/or liberalists whose theoretical assumptions and methodological propositions differ from the realists. [For discussions on the paradigms of constructivism, liberalism, and realism, see Scott Burchill, et al, Theories of International Relations Third Edition (New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Another introductory book and comprehensive reference for theories on Security and International Relations is by John M Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge CB2 IRP: Virtual Publishing by Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Jennifer Sterling--Folker, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading," in International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No.1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 73-97; and John Gerald Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-

Constructivists are what I can describe as the academics who believe that a pacifist world can be constructed by utopian principles, whereas *realists* are the strategists who rationalize that a naturally hostile environment calls for necessary actions—such as using the right mix of forces or power sources by the state in order for it to survive and thrive.

Constructive realism, as an epistemic point of view, looks at the strategic realm of security from two paradigmatic lens. This is to see clearly and critically the complex dynamics of social agents and their constructed ideals, of power-seeking actors and their material capabilities, and of security realities in the natural setting. More so, this is to think strategically about security problems, and work decisively on viable options, rational solutions, and/or acceptable negotiations on matters of national security.

This article is organized into four parts. In the next part following this introduction, I will delve on the subject of national security policy as socially constructed and strategically oriented. In the third part of the paper, I will propose some policy guidelines which are aimed at paving the normative path and strategic direction for Philippine security in the first quarter of this century. Specifically these include: (1) boosting economic growth for citizens' welfare, national prosperity, and international competitiveness; (2) modernizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines for territorial defense and maritime security; (3) strengthening and broadening the Philippine public safety system for internal peace and security; and, (4) promoting Filipino values and universal principles for national resiliency, diplomatic influence, and regional stability. In the fourth and last part, I will conclude by reiterating the clarion call for policymakers and security administrators to adopt a culture of strategic thinking in order to realize the value-laden policy objective of national security.

National Security Policy as Socially Constructed and Strategically Oriented

National security, which I defined as a guarantee that the values and interests of a sovereign state are protected and preserved, must also be comprehended as culture-based, policy-led, and strategy-driven. Only with a comprehension of this nature of national security as a socially constructed and strategically oriented policy can we begin to acquire the knowledge and ability to define, develop, defend, and secure what we value most as a nation.

In this Chapter, I will discuss how a policy on national security is significantly shaped by strategic culture, and how a written policy on the same is substantially linked to strategy. Keen knowledge on this will get us closer to learning the underlying strategic thought that must be discernible in national security policy writing.

Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," <u>International Organization</u> Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 855-885.]

National Security Policy as Significantly Shaped by Strategic Culture

In national security policy and strategy-making, the influence of culture is central in defining national interests, in discerning threats against these, and in determining the state policy to secure these interests. The idea that culture and identity affect the politics of national security policy was propounded by Katzenstein in the classic book reader on "The Culture of National Security" (1996). The national security policy studies in the reader explored two determinants—"the cultural-institutional context of policy" and "the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors."[6] From the perspective of *sociological-institutionalism*, the studies provide critical insights on the importance of cultural norms, social institutions, and collective identity of a state in shaping interest-based national security policies and world politics. This viewpoint is similar if not synonymous with constructive realism as the challenge for scholarship in national security policy analysis.

Sociological studies on national security concentrate on cultural factors, but they also connect to other determinants of power politics in making sense of the real world of security. This, in the sense, makes the constructivist genre of sociological-institutionalism also realist in other inherent aspects of security studies. The critical eye of looking at the ideational foundations of national security complements the rational side of analyzing the behavioral patterns of a state in the kind of policies and politics that it wields, and in the manner it chooses to employ its powers. When a purely realist theory falls short of explaining what it sees as irregularity in unexpected policy change of a state, a constructivist thought fills in to understand how culture defines the self-conception, motivation, and reaction of a state.

Policy decisions are deemed culture-bound; but cultural parameters in the decision-making processes of states also adapt to changes in political and security relations. The cultural characteristics that characterize state behavior and policy can also be recast, reformed, and/or reoriented as a result of significant turning points in history. This can be seen, for instance, in the evolution of the Japanese security policies from a war fighting empire in the Second World War to a pacifist and non-militarist nation in the post war, and to a pro-active security actor in the region beginning the first decade of this century.[7] This, along with other examples in world history in the last hundred years, shows how context can sometimes change culture and policy in a bid to protect national interests at given times. To capture these theoretical dynamics, cultural studies look into the value formations of state policy without veering away from the predominantly realist theory that explains it.

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[6] See Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[7] See National Security Strategy of Japan (2013).

Duffield, in "Political Culture and State Behavior" (1999), discussed political culture as a dominant and determining factor in the study of foreign and security policies of states.[8] He defined culture as a widely held and relatively stable belief system and way of life of a political collectivity, such as the nation-state, which can be distinguished from the beliefs and behaviors of individuals that compose it.[9] *Political culture*, according to Duffield, predisposes the state towards certain options and actions which other state actors may not likely take even under similar conditions and capacities.[10]

In the same vein, I defined political culture in an earlier journal as a mindset that guides decision-making and makes policy morally compelling. To note, I wrote that political culture is demonstrated in how political leaders and policymakers see issues of public interest, focus on problems of utmost importance, set these on the policy table, choose from among alternative solutions, and make decisions for the public good.[11] Political culture is also manifested in the societal norms, expectations, and cohesion that make people support or resist the policy positions of political decision-makers.

The relation of political culture to strategy is central to the development of strategic thought. Snyder coined this way of thinking as *strategic culture* in his 1977 analysis of the behavioral propensities of the former Soviet Union and the implication of these on Soviet military strategies, particularly on nuclear operations.[12] Theoretically, Snyder's classic work provides the intellectual and institutional context for analyzing the cultural factors that reinforce and/or restrain the strategic use of force by the state. His contribution to contemporary security thought is the strategic analysis of the relations between the attitude of the state towards the use of force, and its development of military doctrines and technological capabilities.[13]

A classic definition of strategic culture is in the study of Gray on "Nuclear Strategy and National Style" (1986). According to Gray, strategic culture refers to "modes of thought and action with respect to use of force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms, and from the civic culture and way of life."[14] For Lantis, in "Strategic Culture and National Security

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[8] See John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neo-Realism," International Organization Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 765-803.

[9] Ibid., p. 770.

[10] Ibid., p. 771.

[11] Almase, pp. 34-35.

[12] See Jack L. Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" (A Project Air Force Report prepared for the United States Air Force Operations and published by The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1977).

[13] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[14] Quoted in Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," International Studies Association (Massachusetts, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p. 94.

Policy" (2002), reference was made to a commitment to national values such as "democratic principles and institutions, ideas on morality and the use of force, the rights of individuals or collectivities, or predispositions toward the role of the country in global politics."[15]

Taking into account that culture matters in the conduct and avoidance of war, the United States (US) Army War College developed a thought template on the role and relevance of culture in the effective use of power in the international system. The conceptual map, called the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP), serves as a structured approach for analyzing the security context within which multiple actors construct and compete in their own ways to protect their interests. The ACFSP, as illustrated by Shepherd in "Navigating the Linkage Between Culture and Strategy" (2012), has three dimensions: identity, political culture, and resilience. The interactions of these cultural dimensions define the state's raison d'être or reason for existence, as well as unite peoples towards a national goal. Their sense of a common purpose, with which they can identify as a nation, is the driving force of their self-determination to pursue their strategic goal with effectiveness and rigidity.[16]

The dimensions of culture form national values and interests that in turn determine policy and strategy on national and international security. As a worldview—or a frame for viewing and interacting with the world, the ACFSP, according to Sheperd, provides an "in depth exploration of the strategic environment for the clues to understanding how actors see themselves, define their purpose or reason for existence, mobilize political power, organize politically and socially, conceive of security, ask security-related questions, use force and adapt to or resist changes in their relationships to the strategic environment." [17]

The cultural framework was likewise used as an explanatory model for national security policy and strategy-making processes by Jones, in "Strategic Thinking and Culture: A Framework of Analysis" (2012). In his article, he defined strategic culture as referring to national values, tradition, attitudes, symbols, policies, and strategies, especially with respect to the threat or use of force.[18] The reference to the international political system is also clear in

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[15] Ibid., p. 90.

[16] Thomas Sheperd, "Navigating the Linkage Between Culture and Strategy: A Guide to Understanding the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy" in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: National Security Policy and Strategy Volume II Edited by J Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (USA: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2012), p. 278.

[17] Ibid., pp. 276-277.

[18] This definition of *strategic culture* was referenced by Jones to Booth's article on "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed." [See Frank L. Jones, "Strategic Thinking and Culture: A Framework of Analysis" in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: National Security Policy and Strategy Volume II Edited by J Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (USA: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2012), p. 292. See also Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Carl G Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power (New York, USA: St Martin's Press, 1990).]

Jones' perspective on state identity,[19] political system, and national resilience. Jones' writings below explain the external orientation of strategic culture which has two aspects:

> The first is how that state perceives and <u>understands its role in the international order</u> (superpower, middle power, etc.) and how it <u>understands the strategic environment</u> in terms of benignancy and hostility, recognizing that it is not only a function of worldview but its relationships with other states. Further, benignancy and hostility relate to how a nation-state adopts or resists outside ideas and influences that not only affect its political culture and strategic culture, but also how it perceives its security environment. In terms of the latter, states will <u>adopt alliances or other mechanisms</u> such as membership in international organizations <u>to reduce their insecurity</u> (the fear of threats) or <u>to further cooperation</u> and thereby <u>maintain a level of power in an anarchic system</u>.[20] (Underline provided.)

The scholarly interest of the US Army think tank in cultural analysis stems from the idea that good strategy presumes knowledge of culture—which, as Sheperd acknowledged, is only a return to the basics of strategic art. As he wrote: "The foundation of successful strategic thinking demands that a strategic leader know himself—especially his analytical biases and preferences—know the same about others, and use reflection to integrate the insights gained for clearer understanding of the facts, assumptions, and considerations relative to the national interests." [21] His thoughts on understanding oneself and the enemy to gain victory is reminiscent of one of the incipient principles on strategy in Sun Tzu's "The Art of War."[22]

It can be seen from the preceding studies that the moral perception on the use of force or on the role of the military is central in understanding national security policy and strategy from a worldview. Knowledge on strategic culture allows policy analysts to introspect the country's social and political motivations, and also to unveil the thought-ways of other security players for doing the things that they do. This genre of cultural studies on security and strategy is also known as *cultural realism*, which is likewise in the same paradigm of constructive realism.[23]

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[19] Jones defined state identity as the state's conception of itself through its history, traditions, values, and other factors such as religion, ethnicity, and language. [Jones, p. 299.]

[20] Ibid.

[21] Sheperd, pp. 276-277.

[22] One of the timeless principles of Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" is to know oneself and the enemy. It was once said that if you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer defeat. If you do not know yourself and the enemy, defeat is assured. This principle, postulated in the context of planning a siege, also applies in a general strategic environment of competition, conflict, and/or uncertainty. Among several books written to interpret Sun-Tzu's 2,400 year-old texts in "The Art of War," see J. H. Huang, The Art of War of Sun Tzu (New York, USA: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), p. 52.

[23] *Cultural realism* characterized Johnston's analysis of Chinese security policy in "Thinking About Strategic Culture." [See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Studies Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32-45.

De Castro, in "Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics" (2014), defined strategic culture as that which "encapsulates a country's strategic posture, its place in the international hierarchy of power, and the nature of its external ambition."[24] He described the strategic culture in the Philippines as an expression and function mainly of the policy preferences of political elites whose conception of national security is internal and parochial. Created as a public policy, the use of the military is directed against lawless elements (i.e. extortionists, terrorists, insurgents, and secessionists) and for peace and development in the countryside.

In an earlier journal, De Castro's perception of an anomalous civil-military relations in the Philippines pointed out that the country, like other non-Western states, has liberal use of its military to achieve internal consolidation and nation-building. Because of this critical function of the Philippine military, albeit in a democratic country with 70 years of independence, our cultural history shows a kind of relations where the military is not necessarily subordinate to civilian authorities. This is especially true in local areas where local officials and civilian uniformed personnel—disinterested, untrained, and/or constrained—defer to military "partners" to do an otherwise civilian job of peace and order, community policing, service delivery, and socioeconomic development.[25]

In framing a national security policy in a previous journal, I included the key reinforcing constructs of *political culture* and *strategic culture*. Political culture is that which is practiced in the domestic setting, and strategic culture is that which is applied to the strategic environment above the state. I also talked about *strategic history* which refers to the knowledge and accounting of the outcomes and impacts of security policies in the past. A critical retrospection of history—such as the saga of war, peace, and conflict in the country—can be taken as a strategic resource of charting the future by continuing or changing the trajectories of the past.[26] What I earlier wrote in my perspective of strategic culture in another journal is worth reiterating in this part of the paper:

> Strategic culture, thus, is a worldview that makes it possible for a state to look beyond its shores or boundaries for threats and opportunities; relate with other states in the region; and, more importantly, use its elements of power—diplomatic, economic, informational, military, etc.—to advance and safeguard national interests. Being strategic also looks at the bigger picture on a system wide level where the interests to be protected transcend the parochial and competing agenda of various interest groups;

[24] Renato C. De Castro, "Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics." Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 35 No. 2 (2014), p. 2.

[25] Renato C. De Castro, "21st Century Philippine Civil-Military Relations: Why Partnership Instead of Subordination?" National Security Review (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2012), pp. 136-138.

[26] Almase, pp. 34-35.

outlive the political terms of self-interested policy-makers; and, symbolize what it means as a nation in a community of other sovereign states.[27] (Underline provided.)

National Security Policy as Substantially Linked to Strategy

A strategic outlook on national security is founded on a disciplined way of thinking and analyzing the character of this field—the management of which is the function of policy and strategy. A policy is based on informed situations and scenarios, idealized goals and positions, rationalized choices and decisions, as well as educated perspectives and frameworks. If it were not, then a policy would only be a body of sweeping and scattered political statements whose attainments are not linked to strategy.

For the academics, a policy can only be translated to strategy if the former is communicated with conscious effort of using the grammatically correct strategic language. The relations of the ends of policy to the required ways and means is the basic definition of strategy and also the centerpiece of theory building on this subject.[28] In the praxis of national security policy making, strategy is defined as an art and a science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation together with its military in times of war and peace.[29] For a state with a worldview, strategy is taken as the broadest approach in the pursuit of national objectives in the international system.[30]

Notably, the role of the military in strategy formulation is highlighted even in a policy discourse of widening the scope of Security Studies. As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde asserted in "Security: A New Framework of Analysis" (1998), ". . . but the key strategy was to allow widening only inasmuch as it could be linked to concerns about the threat or actual use of force between political actors." The scholars went further by quoting Chapman in his work on "The Future of Strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy" (1992), to wit: "The structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force. . . . Non-military aspects of security may occupy more of the strategist's time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst's inquiries."[31]

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[27] Ibid, p. 35.

[28] H. Richard Yarger, "Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model." [Look in http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm.]

[29] David Jablonsky, "Why Is Strategy Difficult?" in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Theory of War and Strategy Vol I: , Edited by J Boone Bartholomees, Jr (Pennsylvania, US: Army War College, 2012), p. 9.

[30] J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy" in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Theory of War and Strategy Vol I, Edited by J Boone Bartholomees, Jr (Pennsylvania, US: Army War College, 2012), p. 18.

[31] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 3.

In the Strategy and Policy Course in the US Naval War College, strategy—as an inherently military term—is defined as the relationship between the political purpose of war and the means to achieve this end using the military and non-military instruments of national power. The strategic objective is not just to win the war, but also to set the conditions conducive to lasting peace and progress thereafter.[32] Aside from the use of force as the lynchpin in a security strategy, the appraisal of the anarchic character of the environment to which this is applied by states is central to the discussion of strategy. To note, anarchy is the state of nature in an international system where a hierarchical political structure of a world government is absent, as this is also undesirable among sovereign countries with their own militaries.

The strategic setting is where security actors interact in a contest of promoting their interests and protecting these against determined foes. Thus, there is a principle in strategy that the enemy has a vote in the outcome of war;[33] in other words, the superiority or inferiority of other security players determines in part the strategic success of another. This dictum points back to the importance of understanding one's culture, capability, and capacity relative to those of other security actors with their own strategic cultures or "ways of war."[34]

A clear course of action to safeguard the country's high-value interests, which are clearly stated in policy, is the key to formulating a strategy. The determination of national security interests is thus central in framing a national security policy, along with a strategy to execute this. The relation between national interests and strategy was explained by Robert J. Art below:

> The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation's national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation's foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully justified, not merely assumed.[35] (Underline provided.)

Typically, the national interests at the forefront of a policy or a strategy document include: sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, safety of citizens, economic trade,

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[32] US Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Phase II. (Syllabus for Senior Level Course of the Joint Professional Military Education, US Naval War College, New Port, Rhode Island, 2012), p. 4.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 19.

[35] Quoted in Alan G. Stolberg, "Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century," US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: National Security Policy and Strategy Vol. II Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (USA: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2012), p. 13. See also Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY, and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 45.

national values and universal principles (e.g. freedom, democracy, respect for the rule of law and international order), and strategic position in the region and/or the international community. To promote and protect these interests, the state strives to hone and harness its diplomatic, economic, military, informational, and moral instruments of national power. The latter power in the strategy chest of a nation-state is what Joseph Nye coined as the "soft power" of a country with admirable culture and noble ideals that attract and get the support of other state and non-state actors.[36]

Through statecraft, the strategic instruments of power are brought to play skillfully to advance the values and interests of the country. Given this security goal, a national security strategy provides a strategic direction for the country in the midst of regional security dynamics and international politics.[37]

For progressive countries with developed democracies, strategic thinking is communicated explicitly in their published national security strategies. Among others, a notable National Security Strategy (NSS) with educated definition and appreciation of strategy in the Message of the Head of the State is that of Spain.[38] Prime Minister Rajoy Brey in Spain's "National Security Strategy, 2013: Shaping a Common Project" began his Message by articulating the vision of security for Spain and the concept of strategy that is embedded in the objective of policy. The Message stated that:

> Security is a cornerstone of development and progress in a free society. A basic and widespread understanding of the importance of security as a guarantee of citizens' well-being and the stability of the State itself is therefore essential.
>
> This vision can only be articulated through a Strategy that defines a global and all-embracing frame of reference in security matters; a Strategy that envisages the unique characteristics of the risks and threats we face in a world that is undergoing changes as deep as they are constant; a Strategy that orients the State's action towards responding to current challenges by using the available resources flexibly and efficiently; a Strategy that enhances our prevention, protection and response capabilities in an increasingly complex environment like today's.[39] (Underline provided.)

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[36] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, USA: Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, 2004).

[37] Almase, p. 38.

[38] The NSS of Spain, which is a Mediterranean State in Europe, became a particular subject of interest in my national security studies after having visited officially the country together with other delegates of the Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) Regular Class 50 from the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) in May 2015.

[39] See Message of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy Brey of Spain in its "National Security Strategy, 2013: Sharing a Common Project" at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=177647 .

The theoretically rich statements above place in proper perspective the pursuit of a strategic policy on national security. Although modest, due to constrained economic capacity of a country like Spain, the message conveys a firm intention to secure the freedom and stability of the state as well as the well-being of citizens through flexible use of available resources. Not only is the Message clear on the strategic imperatives of the nation-state, its conceptual frame of understanding the real meaning of security is also comprehensible.

Following a comprehensive definition of what strategy means in a security policy, the policy message must provide a cursory scanning of the risks and threats in the strategic environment, as well as a brief description of the unique characteristics of the country. Knowledge of these in the beginning defines the strategic objectives and power projection of the country in the world, which is important in the NSS.[40]

As the starting point of policy making, a comprehension of what security means to a nation-state is primordial. In the example that we have, Spain devoted the first Chapter of its NSS to a discussion of its "Comprehensive Vision of National Security." This part defines national security and identifies its referents which need to be defended, safeguarded, and protected as a matter of policy; to wit:

> Security, as an essential component in defending constitutional values and achieving the ideals of justice, prosperity and progress, is a cornerstone of the preservation, stability and continuity of the State, as well as of the lives and well-being of its citizens. . . .
>
> The concept of security in the 21st century must be broad and dynamic in order to cover all the areas which concern the security of the State and its citizens; these vary in accordance with rapid developments in the strategic environment and range from territorial defence to economic and financial stability or the protection of critical infrastructures.[41] (Underline provided.)

In defending, safeguarding, and protecting the underlined values and interests, the NSS is clear on its core policy areas of national defense and public security through

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[40] As Prime Minister Brey stated in the third and fourth paragraphs of his Message in the NSS, following the previously quoted first and second paragraphs:

> Added to the traditional risks and threats are new, generally transnational ones which are interconnected and increase their danger; and at the same time new gaps are emerging that facilitate their spread and impact. Today cyberspace is the clearest example of an area that is accessible, loosely regulated and difficult to control and cybersecurity is therefore one of the main areas of action covered by this Strategy.
>
> Spain, as a Mediterranean European Union Member State with a privileged but complex geographical location, has a clear-cut profile of its own. These particular characteristics define our specific strategic objectives. On the basis of defending these interests and strategic values, Spain's projection in the global environment is aimed at pursuing and promoting international stability, peace and security.

[41] See Spain's "National Security Strategy, 2013: Sharing a Common Project," pp. 5-6.

multilateral cooperation in the external environment and citizen collaboration in the domestic setting.[42] This requires imbibing a kind of strategic culture which is referred to as "a sound security culture" in the same NSS that we take as an example; to wit:

> Citizens' collaboration and support are essential. This involvement will be possible if a <u>sound security culture</u> is fostered based on <u>prior knowledge, awareness and sensitivity to the importance of security in guaranteeing their freedom, prosperity and, in short, their way of life in accordance with the principles of the social and democratic way of life</u>.

> <u>The National Security Policy requires the planning and definition of permanent principles and lines of action capable of providing comprehensive responses to current threats</u>. <u>It needs to be sustained over time, going beyond the timespans and particular political agendas of each Government</u>. Therefore National Security is underpinned by the commitment and consensus of everyone to act in a concerted and cohesive manner.[43] (Underline provided.)

It can be seen that the Spanish way of thinking about and attitude towards national security policy and strategy is fostered by a profound understanding of what this means to national survival and success. What can be taken away from this is the importance of looking at the subject of security from an educated frame in order to make things right at the start. In so doing, a country's NSS does not only provide a plan of action on national security, it educates the citizens on how to see it correctly.

For another country with the same democratic values and security objectives, but with superior economic capabilities, a proactive stance to contribute to international peace and security was advanced in the opening message of its NSS. In the landmark publication of Japan's NSS in 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also defined at the outset the Japanese worldview and values, characteristic identity and geographical position, as well as national interests and perceived strategic role in the external security environment. These were taken as

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[42] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

On national defense and citizen security, the following are laid out in Spain's "Comprehensive Vision of National Security" in the first Chapter of the NSS:

> In accordance with this comprehensive vision, <u>National Security is the State action aimed at protecting the freedom and well-being of its citizens, guaranteeing the defence of Spain and its constitutional principles and values, and contributing together with our partners and allies to international security in compliance with the commitments undertaken</u>.

> In our country the constitutional mandate to guarantee democratic coexistence within the framework of the Constitution and Spanish Law and <u>to protect citizens in the free exercise of their rights and public freedoms</u> is facilitated by a <u>public security system</u> based chiefly on two State forces, one civilian (the National Police Force) and one military (the Civil Guard [Guardia Civil]). Together with the regional and local police forces, they are responsible for safeguarding citizen security. (Underline provided.)

[43] Ibid.

the premises which guide the policy orientation and strategic actions of the country in addressing the complex security problems in its midst. As the Chief of State wrote:

> In today's interconnected and globalized world, various kinds of threats easily cross national borders. No single country can protect peace and security on its own. Japan is a global power with a rich culture and tradition that upholds universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Furthermore, Japan, as a maritime state that has pursued a policy of "open and stable seas", can only ensure its own peace and security by actively engaging in efforts to make the entire world a more peaceful and secure place.[44]

Below is a more comprehensive description of the Japanese NSS which demonstrates how the policy rhetoric of a diplomatic corps was communicated in the language, grammatical discipline, and semantics of strategy:

> The Strategy first elaborates on Japan's peaceful orientation to date and the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, the Strategy identifies national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner.[45] (Underline provided.)

In the case of the United States (US), with an identity of a superpower, its NSS in 2015 was introduced with a much stronger stance of taking the lead in international security. In the midst of serious challenges faced by the US,[46] President Barack Obama sent the

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[44] See one-page Message of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in "National Security Strategy of Japan" (2013).

[45] "National Security Strategy of Japan," (17 December 2013), p. 1. [Look in http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf]

[46] In his Message in the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (US), President Barack Obama described the security environment as being confronted with a host of complex threats to homeland security and international stability. Specifically, he stated that:

> Now, at this pivotal moment, we continue to face serious challenges to our national security, even as we are working to shape the opportunities of tomorrow. Violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies. Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give rise to anxieties about global security. We must be clear-eyed about these and other challenges and recognize the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet them.

Message of acting as a world leader in a bid to advance American interests, international norms, and universal humanitarian values. As he stated:

> Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.[47]

A self-titled world leader is a security actor that is adept in the strategic art and practice of statecraft. Significantly, this is communicated in the manner clear-cut policy principles and strategic elements are encapsulated in the introduction of the NSS of the US. As the latter published:

> This new National Security Strategy positions the United States to safeguard our national interests through strong and sustainable leadership. It sets out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world. It advances a model of American leadership rooted in the foundation of America's economic and technological strength and the values of the American people. It redoubles our commitment to allies and partners and welcomes the constructive contributions of responsible rising powers. It signals our resolve and readiness to deter and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. It affirms America's leadership role within a rules-based international order that works best through empowered citizens, responsible states, and effective regional and international organizations. And it serves as a compass for how this Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will lead the world through a shifting security landscape toward a more durable peace and a new prosperity.[48] (Underline provided.)

It can be seen from the NSS documents of Spain, Japan, and the US how these countries with entrenched strategic culture conceptualize their national security using the logic and language of policy and strategy-making. The erudite framing of national security is exemplified in the way the strategic heads of states effectively communicate their national security strategies to the world, regardless of differences in economic capabilities.

In the case of the Philippines, the ambiguity and amorphousness of the National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 makes it difficult for strategists, even as an exercise of theorizing, to plan out adaptive, creative, and effective ways of using undeclared instruments of national power at undefined strategic crossroads and decision-points. In a journal on "What the Subject of Security Really Means: A Look Into the Content and Context of the 2011-2016

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[47] Ibid.

[48] See Introduction of the 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 1. [Look in https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf]

National Security Policy in the Philippines" (2013), I analyzed the principles, problems, and politics of the NSP, particularly its constructed meaning of national security. I problematized on the content of a people-centered NSP that had been promulgated at a particular chapter in the country's recent politico-administrative history.[49]

In the messages of other Chiefs of State in their national security policies, reference was made to their well-defined national interests and strategic roles vis-à-vis well-informed security threats in the environment. In the Message of President Benigno S Aquino III in the NSP 2011-2016, a celebration of his transformational leadership was instead highlighted as the defining moment and determining factor in the publication of a landmark policy document on national security. As the President conveyed at the outset:

> A renewed hope for the Filipino people has marked my assumption of office as the 15th President of the Philippines. For years, the Filipino people have been clamoring for transformational leadership that bring forth the ways of democracy and freedom.
>
> Thus, it is my distinct pleasure to issue and enunciate this National Security Policy (NSP) to provide the overarching framework that shall promote the people's welfare and for the posterity of our nation. We look forward to this singular opportunity when the enduring principles and ideals contained in this document will help generate greater interest among our people and our institutions on various issues and concerns that affect our national security—the sum total of our people's well-being as well as our anchor as a democratic country, imbued with our dreams and aspirations.[50]

President Aquino, in his Memorandum No. 6 on "Directing the Formulation of the National Security Policy and National Security Strategy" in October 2010, emphasized that the NSP must focus on four "key elements," which are: (1) good governance; (2) delivery of basic services; (3) economic reconstruction; and (4) security sector reform. In his Message in the NSP that came out in May 2011, the President said the four elements were in line with the "Social Contract" he had made with the Filipino people in his presidential campaign in 2010.

In the Chapter on "Foundations of National Security" in the NSP, the "Social Contract" was presented to have sixteen objectives which are as follows: (1) transformational leadership; (2) job generation; (3) education; (4) reproductive health care; (5) impartial justice system; (6) execution of the rule of law; (7) food security; (8) capacity-building for the poor; (9) economic growth and competitiveness for private businesses; (10) protection for overseas Filipino workers; (11) integrity, competence, and fitness in government service; (12) professional bureaucracy; (13) gender equality; (14) peace and development in

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[49] Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase, "What the Subject of Security Really Means: A Look Into the Content and Context of the 2011-2016 National Security Policy in the Philippines," National Security Review (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2013), p. 99.

[50] See Message of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino III, in the "2011-2016 National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy."

Mindanao; (15) urban planning and community development; and (16) sustainable use of resources.[51] The 16 objectives of the Social Contract were said to be the anchor of the seven "elements of national security." It must be taken into account that these are separate and distinct from the four "key elements" initially outlined in the Message of the President, and in the Introduction of the NSP.

In the following Chapter in the NSP, another set of constructs, apart from the previous ones, was presented as the "seven elements of national security." Specifically, these are: (1) socio-political stability; (2) territorial integrity; (3) economic solidarity; (4) ecological balance; (5) cultural cohesiveness; (6) moral-spiritual consensus; and (7) peace and harmony.[52] Note that the rationalized and/or restrained use of force, combined with other competitive advantages and sources of power of a nation-state, is the central showpiece in any policy and strategy on national security. But in the NSP, it can be seen that the military component was conspicuously written off in the seven elements of national security. How the Executive intended to securitize its national interests using the logic of strategy, or even politicize usual public problems through persuasive security semantics, is both a practical and a theoretical question. In any case, the absence of military defense in the constructed elements of national security does not make the policy document strategic at the outset, nor will it make the nation secure in the end.

Since the military was not defined and dignified as a distinguished component in the given "elements of national security" in the NSP, the latter also fell short of identifying the role and rationale of the military as well as that of the national police and other civilian uniformed agencies in national security. The ambiguity of the roles of state forces in the NSP only portends the fate of the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and of the Philippine National Police (PNP)—the latter of which, normatively, should be projected to take over from the military the function of internal peace and security in the country.[53]

Despite the conspicuous absence of the military in the two sets of elements presented in the NSP, the AFP continues to play an institutional role in the people-centered praxis of national security administration in the Philippines. As an enduring policy and practice in this country, a war-fighting army is being made to perform constabulary, public safety, and development functions in different geographical regions in the country. But at the same time, a 15-year AFP Modernization Program—first enacted in Republic Act (RA) 7898 in 1995 and continued in RA 10349 in 2012—is also being pursued to transform the military from its deficient condition to a minimum defense force. In the absence of strategic thought that accounts for power differentials in the region, the envisioned credibility of a modest defense

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[51] "2011-2016 National Security Policy in the Philippines: Securing the Gains of Democracy," pp. 5-6.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Almase, "Perspective on National Security Policy Framing," p. 37.

force is a serious question, especially when its modernization plan staggers in the midst of chronic political and economic constraints.

In a similar academic fashion, Peleo in his journal on "Secure in Insecurity: The Case of Threat Perception/Acceptance in the Philippines" (2015) also viewed the NSP 2011-2016 as a confused conflation "of political goals that are only partially attainable and of a security environment that remain 'unsecured.'"[54] From an analysis of the threat perceptions in the NSP, Peleo unraveled an implicit concern on the security of the political regime during its term, rather than the long-term stabilization of the state.[55] The social construction of security in the NSP is so loose it does not communicate a sense of urgency on real matters of national security—the kind of which threatens critical and existential aspects of the state.[56]

If the functional areas of public administration were made as referents in a widened national security agenda, then how would these facilitate policy analysis? It must be noted that the tasks of analysis are to rank priorities, provide political choices, calculate risks for each option, weigh costs and benefits, warrant emergency measures, and guide executive decisions. Moreover, how would policy analysis and decision making on such a broad scope of security issues work, given the natural if not inherent constraints of time, resources, and even information?

A correct perspective of national security, as well as a profound understanding of the nature of the environment in which it operates, is thus wanting not only to allow for sound and rational analysis of strategic options, but also to raise security issues on a high level of policy discourse and power politics. Significantly, this will require transcending the low politics of policy-makers in their own familiar domain of public administration, in a move to be au fait with the high politics of statespersons and/or securitizing actors in the strategic realm of international relations.

By looking at the security panorama from the standpoint of a nation-state, we can learn to appreciate the real essence of a security policy and the required strategy that can make an impact in a competitive, if not actually combative or contentious, environment. Conceptually, the centrality of the nation-state—with its referents of sovereignty, territory, citizenry, and polity that must be safeguarded and defended—is what makes national security a strategic field of study and praxis.

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[54] Amador Peleo IV, "Secure in Insecurity: The Case of Threat Perception/ Acceptance in the Philippines," Cogent Social Sciences 1: 1060687 (2015), p. 1. [Look in http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2015.1060687]

[55] Ibid., p. 1.

[56] Ibid., p. 2.

The Strategic Direction for Philippine Security
in the First Quarter of the 21st Century

Having discussed the strategic nature of a national security policy, I will define some broad guidelines in translating strategic thinking to agenda setting.[57] By imbibing a culture of strategy—through proper education and critical conversations—the policy community will be able to sift through piles of social issues and concerns in order to see what public problems have security and strategic implications to the country as well as to the region in which we operate. Theoretically, at least, those are the security problems that demand the highest attention and urgent actions in the level of the state and/or of the system above it.

In setting a strategic plan for Philippine security, policymakers must understand at least two types of agenda—the traditional and the comprehensive, or the "narrow" and the "wide" as Buzan, Waever, and Wilde called these.[58] They described the traditionalists as focused on the strategic use of force for national and international security, and the wideners as concerned about the social, economic, and environmental agenda for comprehensive human security.

It must be taken into account that the wider aspects of security, as proposed by those who challenge the traditional agenda, are greater than the socioeconomic problems that state and society can normally deal with through the usual business of government. The wider security problems are those that pertain to non-state and/or non-military referents that are existentially threatened on a massive scale by environmental catastrophes, financial breakdown, and extremist ideologies, among others. To effectively work out countermeasures against these urgent concerns, states and sectors try to securitize these at the regional or international level in order to gain security status for complex issues that are above the low politics and existing policy structures in domestic domains.

Academics stressed that widening the scope of security beyond the political and military affairs of the state only dilutes the substance of security, defies the logic of securitization, and disregards strategic analysis of options on how to best use the forces and resources of the state. In "The Renaissance of Security Studies" (1991), Stephen Walt's argument against widening the security ambit outside of the traditional domain is worth noting in this section. As quoted from Buzan et al.'s "Security: A New Framework of Analysis" (1998), Walt argued that when security is stretched extensively, such that regular public problems are politicized as security concerns, then:

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[57] For discussions on problem recognition and issue selection in agenda setting, see Werner Jann and Kai Wegrich, "Theories of the Policy Cycle" in Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (CRC Press, Boca Raton, ISBN: 9781420017007), pp. 45-46.

[58] See Buzan et al., "Security: A New Framework of Analysis."

. . . by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to "security." Defining this field this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.[59]

In the light of the epistemic issue raised by scholars of Security Studies, I will lay out in this Chapter the direction of the quest for a real national security policy and strategy by asking the right questions and outlining a strategic agenda for Philippine security in the first quarter of the century. While focused on the state forces that need to be built and strengthened for national security, the agenda also takes cognizance of developing other non-military elements that can make the country resilient, influential, powerful, and secure.

The Key Questions in Formulating the National Security Strategy

To understand fully the substance and structure of a strategic course of action on national security, we need to ask important questions and address these intelligently in the discourse and analysis of policy. In this section, I will articulate some queries that will help policymakers think about the interests of the nation and its strategic track from a domestic purview and a strategic worldview.

What is our geographical location in the region and in the globe? As an archipelago with 7,107 islands in Southeast Asia, how does the physical make-up of our country determine our relations within and with other countries in this region and the Asia Pacific?

As a maritime country, with the South China Sea (SCS) in the west, how does our strategic location determine our security dynamics in the Asia Pacific region? What is the state and nature of the regional security complex that we are in? Who are the relevant security players in this region?

What are the physical attributes of the Philippines as an archipelago and as a maritime country in this part of the region? How do our lands and seas endow us with natural resources and other potentials to our advantage?

On other hand, what are the physical limitations and natural phenomena that constrain and challenge us and our country? How do we cope and grapple with these challenges and turn these into opportunities?

What is the nature of threats in the 21st century world? What in particular are the security referents that are seen to be endangered by those threats? Do the identified referents

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[59] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

have the legitimate claim to survival? How urgent are the actions needed to counter those threats? What are the facilitating conditions that make those threats matters of national and international security?[60]

What extraordinary measures are warranted to protect the security referents? How are these related to our national interests? Are the threats existential to our national survival, as well as those of the others in the region? What are their national interests that compete, conflict, and/or coincide with us and those of other security players?

What are our core and non-negotiable national interests that we as a Filipino nation are willing to fight, sacrifice, and even die for as a matter of honor and principle? Are those interests reflective of our national values, identity, and history? How does culture—which refers to the dynamics of national identity, political values, and resiliency—play in shaping those interests? Are our interests articulated with clarity in a national security policy?

How do we as a nation learn from the past through a critical appraisal of our continuing and future strategic history?[61] Or in other words, how do policymakers—in their strategic appraisal of the security environment—review the lessons from our history of colonization, independence, nation-building, insurgencies, militarization, democratization, and political conflicts? How do we change or continue the state of the nation today with decisive policy action or inaction?

How does political culture mobilize and rally public support to pursue our national interests in ways that are suitable, acceptable, and feasible? Can our culture even be a driving factor for internal unification, domestic strength, and strategic influence?

What kind of strategic culture do we have in developing or deprioritizing our national defense, military, and police forces in a national security agenda? How do we use force, and employ our state forces to defend and protect our national interests?

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[60] Buzan, et .al., in "Security: A New Framework of Analysis" (1998) wrote that:

> The need is to construct a conceptualization of security that means much more specific than just any threat or problem. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. (Underline provided.)

> [Ibid., p. 5.]

[61] For discussions of "future strategic history" and "educated futurology" from a retrospection of defense policies and planning in the past, see Colin Gray, Defense Planning for National Security: Navigation Aids for the Mystery Tour (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2014). [Look in http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/]

How do we intend to use our talents, resources, and forces to advance what we value most as a nation-state? How do we take into account our capacities, limitations, and cultural ways in building the nation and securing this in an uncertain and volatile world?

How do we plan to take advantage of, or gain from our alliances and/or coalitions with other like-minded nations to advance shared interests and address common security challenges in the region?

In what strategic direction in a complex world does our country, which surely is not a closed state, aim to make a headway in terms of protecting our vital security interests? How do we view the world and our place in it in our national security policy and strategy?

The answers to all those comprehensive questions are never easy, but the search for answers will lead us to critical discourses on national security policy and strategy. To be part of intelligent discussions on this subject, we should start learning about the discipline and reasoning of national security as a policy-relevant area of academic inquiry.

The Strategic Agenda in National Security

The themes of the national security agenda are reflective of or tantamount to national interests which recur consistently in a national security strategy (NSS). Keeping in mind the enduring national interests of the country and the security problems it confronts, I will outline and define an interlinked strategic agenda on national security which I hope can get to the policy table of the new political leadership.

The strategic agenda will cover key areas of concern in national security, which are as follows: (1) boosting economic growth for citizens' welfare, national prosperity, and international competitiveness; (2) modernizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines for territorial defense and maritime security; (3) strengthening and broadening the Philippine public safety system for internal peace and security; and (4) promoting Filipino values and universal principles for national resiliency, diplomatic influence, and regional stability.

(1) Boosting Economic Growth for Citizens' Welfare, National Prosperity, and International Competitiveness. For developing countries that strive to build their domestic base as a platform for taking off to a higher plane, strengthening the economy can be taken as the foremost means of getting to its policy ends of national security.[62] As a strategy, economic growth is aspired to not just for the welfare of citizens but ultimately for the prosperity and competitiveness of the country in the region. This is the strategic goal that is certainly bigger

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[62] It must be taken into account that economic interest is not "the" first agenda in developed countries' national security strategies that are focused on the defense and protection of their citizens, critical infrastructures, homelands, constitutional principles, and international order against real security threats. See our given examples of the recent National Security Strategies of Spain, Japan, and the United States.

than the economic interests of industries and the economic desires of individuals. The satisfaction of individual level economic needs, which is being emphasized for populist effect in political campaigns, is primordial especially for the survival of the poor. But this is not the kind of assurance that can make a nation secure in a contest of economic powers and/or strong-willed economic players in the region and in the international community.

Socioeconomic development that is designed for the subsistence of the poor—whose satisfaction is taken as a measure of policy effectiveness—is not synonymous with the economic component of national security. This is an important point that I want to underscore in the economic agenda of a national security strategy. Economic progress that merely caters to the welfare of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups is not a national security objective. This is still far from the strategic direction and power projection needed for Philippine security—unless we can channel human resource development as a social capital to enhance the country's competitiveness, resilience, defense, and sustainability.

To promote the country's economic interests, the strategy must be geared towards the following: job generation and productivity; revenue generation (taxation and public finance); resource mobilization (investments, recruitment of highly qualified work force, development of new sources of energy, etc.); trade and commerce (robust industries, gross domestic product); capability building (innovation, training and education, research and development, information technology); and competitive advantages and niches (quality products and services). The presence of these key concepts in a policy communication can tell whether an economic agenda can suffice as a strategy of a state policy on comprehensive security, and not just a development program of a localized public policy. The level of aspirations sought can tell about the strategic nature of an economic policy—the kind which can move the country forward and afford it its desired level of security.

Looking at the description of "economic reconstruction" under the first and primary agenda of promoting "socio-political stability" in the National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 in the Philippines, what appears as a revolutionary approach in "reconstructing the economy" does not look like it. The "economic agenda" in the NSP is mainly focused on the provision of basic services to disadvantaged sectors of the population.[63] With this, it can be

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[63] Nonetheless, the lack of strategic concepts was filled in, even only in writing, by a statement in the NSP that:

> In being strategic, the government identifies the institutions and infrastructures needed to plan, implement and evaluate the proper service system, covering the provision of basic social welfare, such as food, housing, basic education, universal healthcare, and social security programs.

> The fundamental instrument to pursue the development agenda of government is the Medium-term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) prepared by NEDA.

> The country focuses on strategic measures and activities to spur economic growth and create jobs. This can only be done through a common purpose and in viewing problems and its solutions from a common frame of reference, which the MTPDP seeks to be for all

seen that the inward looking economic security being sought in the NSP is centered mainly on people's welfare as an apparent end goal in itself by a public policy. There is no substantial discussion of the external dynamics of a complex and interdependent politico-economic system nor of the underlying national interest of making the citizens productive. The promotion of socioeconomic welfare, when taken as a state policy on national security, must be clearly linked to an overarching national strategy of how investments in human development can contribute to the pooling of talents and resources necessary to strengthen the country's productivity, competitiveness, resiliency, and security.

Knowing that the economic agenda for national security is a strategic disposition taken by the state, a policy in this regard is not supposed to be fixated on ensuring the regular functions of government, such as the provision of basic services, social security, and employment. If this were so, then the publication of a policy on national security with an economic dimension would be unnecessary in the usual business of maintaining a status quo. What is needed in a national security policy is a strategic communication of how the national economy can be raised to the level of sustainable growth, international competitiveness, and national power.

Notably, the proposed economic agenda—drafted in February 2016 by the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR) along with the Philippine Ambassadors Foundation, Inc. (PAFI)—incorporates the strategic interests of the country.[64] From the perspective of diplomats and policy analysts, a strategy on growth and development is inextricably linked to a high level of political economy, and not just to the mundane functions of economic activities within the domestic sphere.

The PCFR and PAFI expressed the belief that sustained and long-term economic growth and development can be realized by adopting strategic trade policy and *development diplomacy*. This, notably, is the order in the economic policy regime constructed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus other countries with economic interests in this region. It must be noted that diplomacy, along with defense and development, is an essential element in the pursuit of national security in the international realm. The ability to engage, influence, negotiate, and mobilize other economic players in the Asia Pacific region for more open investment and trade regimes is what makes it strategic, which is a characteristic of high politics.

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stakeholders. In this connection, strategic public-private partnerships serve as vehicle of the Government's economic policy initiatives. (Underline provided)

[See "2011-2016 National Security Policy in the Philippines: Securing the Gains of Democracy," pp. 24-26.]

[64] The agenda was presented by the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR) and the Philippine Ambassadors Foundation, Inc. (PAFI), both headed by Ambassador Jose V. Romero, Jr., PhD, in a draft paper with the title "Moving Forward." This was distributed to PCFR and PAFI members during our regular meeting held at the Department of Foreign Affairs in February 2016.

In this regard, the PCFR-PAFI, in its draft agenda, advocates for the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to reassert its mandate as the primary responsible for the conduct of development diplomacy. In coordination with other agencies, the DFA, according to the PCFR-PAFI, must play an active role in forging strategic partnerships and functional cooperation with other countries in a bid to build up our economy and capacity for security. Development diplomacy is intended to achieve several objectives, which are: to accelerate the rate of foreign capital inflow to the country; to facilitate transfer of technology to local industries; to seek new markets for Philippine products abroad; to develop competitive advantages in the export of high-value goods and services; and to lobby against the imposition of trade barriers to our products in the world market.

The Philippine government's foreign policy goal has been, for a long time, primarily focused on providing assistance to Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)—which is the only agenda with an international dimension in the Social Contract of the NSP. The OFWs, totaling more than 8 million, contributed vital remittances to the Philippines with a figure of about 25 billion US dollars in 2012. Their remittances fuel the national economy by stimulating high levels of demand for goods, services, consumption, and construction. A major source of economic lifeblood for Filipino families and the country, the export of workers and professionals, as well as their protection abroad, has dominated much of the Philippine foreign policy agenda for the past decades.[65]

In the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, the set courses of action are aimed at reorienting the economy towards trade, investments, and exports in order to increase productivity, strengthen innovative capacities, create new jobs, and redistributive wealth. These macro-economic goals, which are in line with the strategic or external economic affairs, can be realized through public-private partnerships within and outside of the country, export promotion strategy, and foreign direct investments (FDI). Among others, the FDI is designed to accumulate capital and foreign exchange reserves, build and upgrade infrastructure, generate employment, transfer technology to local industries, and teach new knowledge and development models from best practices.[66]

But to gain from opportunities brought by FDI, we must develop the capabilities and capacities to absorb and utilize advanced technologies and management processes for sustained growth in domestic products and national income. There is also a need to invest in human capital through continuous training and education; to reform fiscal structures by giving tax incentives and infrastructure subsidies; to lower the costs of production, such as of power

[65] Renato C. De Castro, "The Aquino Administration's Foreign Policy Agenda: The 'Return' of Geopolitics in Philippine External Relations," Thinking Beyond Politics: A Strategic Agenda for the Next President (Makati City: Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), pp. 14, 15 & 19.

[66] See Epictetus E. Patalinghug, "Foreign Direct Investment, Exports, and Philippine Economic Growth," Thinking Beyond Politics: A Strategic Agenda for the Next President (Makati City, Philippines: Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies Publications, 2015), pp. 50-51.

and communication; to provide adequate ports and transportation system; and to ensure good governance and conducive security environment.[67]

On the whole, the strategy of promoting the economic interests of the country for national security is all about building strong economic infrastructure, establishing competitive industries, formulating innovative fiscal policies (i.e. revenue generation, resource allocations, accountability, etc.), capacitating the human capital, developing comparative advantages, and offering a high level of product sophistication as well as professional services in the global market.

In a national security strategy, economic development is connected to defense and security. Macro-economic gains and growth are logically proportionate to defense expenditures and military posture for national security. This means that the defense capability and security standing of the state is indicative of its economic capacity; likewise, the economic foothold of the country is suggestive of its military strength.

(2)   Modernizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines for Territorial Defense and Maritime Security. For developed states with the economic means to safeguard their acquired gains and other security interests, the defense of their countries and safety of citizens highlight their National Security Strategies (NSS). Moreover, strategic state actors also tie up their defense plans and posture to geopolitics or to their political and security relations with other players in the region.

A strategy or a strategic analysis on national security starts with a profiling of the geographical characteristics of the country that form part of its identity. No learned analyst can escape this basic information that is the starting point of a policy and strategy on national security. Geography matters significantly in defining and determining the politics and security dynamics between and among countries in a regional complex.

In geographically- clustered states, which may share common culture and/or language, it is their territorial boundaries that distinguish their national identities and security interests. In this regard, the extent of national territories, as well as the strength of territorial claims, is the basis of a country's defense and security posture.

To ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity, countries build up their militaries as strategic leverage along with other elements of national power. The military component of national security aims to project credible deterrence, defend the country against external threats, balance power in the region, engage in defense diplomacy, ally and/or join coalition(s) with other like-minded states, and ensure international order. The latter objective, to note, is one of the primary interests of states with a worldview.

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[67] Ibid., p. 68.

The outward looking view stands on the principle that only in a secure and stable international regime, even if states militarize it, can their citizens and economies survive and prosper. This realist strategy stands as long as idealist hopefulness does not have a realistic option that can render the military obsolete even as the backbone of diplomacy. It must be noted that in the literature of negotiation, especially in an adversarial condition, the dictum that "hope is not a strategy" cannot easily be challenged without a beating in the end.[68]

In a geographical setting where territorial jurisdictions and claimed national sovereignty are contested, the security condition is tense and fragile not only for concerned states but for the region as well. For an aggrieved country that is relatively and/or militarily weak, the security situation is even more precarious and highly uncertain. Logic and reason will tell this security dilemma is the most pressing concern of an affected state in its national security policy and strategy. However, threat perceptions are shaped by the political culture of policymakers that disagree on what the security problem is really all about.

In discussing the strategic nature of a security policy, I pointed out that the seven elements of national security in the NSP 2011-2016 in the Philippines do not include the military, for whatever populist effect this may have on the masses. Rather, the following concepts are given as the "elements" that make up national security: (1) socio-political stability; (2) territorial integrity; (3) economic solidarity; (4) ecological balance; (5) cultural cohesiveness; (6) moral spiritual consensus; and (7) peace and harmony.

The seven elements above—whose order of appearance suggests either a ranking of priorities or just a random list of principles—do not have utilitarian value in strategizing on what to do about national security, particularly on how to use force. The seven elements also appear as generic principles of governance and development administration which are applicable even in decentralized local government units (LGUs). Note that in the case of the LGUs, local chief executives and their administrators do not have to include or highlight the military in their development plans because their security and safety are already taken care of by the central government above them.

In the foregoing cultural thought frame, which was conveyed in the NSP, the question then is: under whose or what security umbrella are we relying on for our national defense and security? If building up our own military and highlighting this theme in the NSP is thought to be unpopular from a particular cultural standpoint of domestic society that has other priorities, then why is the option of resorting to military alliance(s)—or should I say reliance on allies—and making this as the centerpiece of a national security policy also unacceptable?

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[68] This principle was accentuated by Prof Brian Mendell in his lectures in "Mastering Negotiation: Building Agreements Across Boundaries" in the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Executive Education Program in Harvard University, Cambridge in April 2016.

Located in Southeast Asia, the Philippines is an archipelago with 7,107 islands, and thus with one of the longest coastlines in the world. Clearly, the Philippines is a privileged maritime country with rich marine resources, but for which maritime security is also a critical challenge. But unlike Japan that explicitly states its identity as a maritime country and its utmost concern for maritime security in the introduction of its NSS in 2013, the Philippines in the National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 is oblivious of its geography and maritime identity in framing its national security.

The geographical location of the Philippines, with the South China Sea (SCS) in the west part of the country, is particularly crucial not only for the Philippines but also for the United States (US) and other countries with strategic interests in the SCS. The latter is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded mostly by China, which is an emerging military power in the region, and other small littoral states in Southeast Asia that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, which have claims over islands and maritime jurisdictions in the contested sea.[69]

The SCS became the cauldron of brewing conflict in the region as a result of China's aggressive stance of claiming sovereignty over the entire SCS. Following its contentious nine-dashed territorial line in the SCS, China drew international attention and caused regional tension for violating international laws and conventions on maritime domain. To bolster its preposterous claim, China increased its naval presence in the SCS, defied arbitration and multilateral negotiations, disagreed on having a code of conduct in the SCS, and built islands in contested maritime areas.

Pushed by China's bullying tactics in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, the latter in January 2013 filed a case with the Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the basis of international law, the Philippines challenged the legitimacy of China's expansive claims in the SCS. The refusal of the government administration to engage in bilateral talks with China on this issue further strained relations with this naval power in the region. It is against this backdrop that the Philippines is faced with security realities and deficiencies that demand strategic options, internal and external negotiations, and political determination.

Despite its legislation in two periods of presidential administration, the long drawn and unrealized modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is kept hostage to fiscal constraints, political concessions, bureaucratic delays, and even corruption. If the military component were continuously relegated to the periphery of a national security policy,

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[69] De Castro, "The Aquino Administration's Foreign Policy Agenda...," p. 2.

and expenditures for military modernization were postponed and diminished, I believe this would have serious consequence to national security in the real sense of the word.

Reason dictates that the Executive—on behalf of the AFP that aspires for a minimum credible force and still does not get it—must have a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) on increasing defense expenditures. Logically, even a budgetary assurance for the legislated 15-year modernization program for a modest defense force is immaterial in real time to the growing naval power of an aggressive China that asserts sovereignty over the Philippine seas and occupied islands in the SCS.

In the interest of national security, it seems that the BATNA on military modernization for the Philippines at this time is to invoke its standing security treaty with the US. This is to solidify the security protection provided for in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MTD) with the US—of which the Philippines had been a commonwealth for ten years before independence in 1946. It is deemed beneficial to both countries that the MTD be enhanced for common security interests of regional stability and international order. It is for this reason that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was crafted and signed in April 2014 by the Defense Secretary of the Republic of the Philippines and the American Ambassador in the country.

The signing of EDCA came at a time when the security condition became highly uncertain and volatile after the Philippines had filed an arbitration case against China. To balance power in the SCS and maximize security benefits, the Philippines and US agreed on Increased Rotational Presence (IRP) of American forces in Philippine military facilities and other ports in the Philippines. Not only does the IRP facilitate efficient deployment of allied forces in the SCS or the West Philippine Sea, the defense cooperation also enables the Philippine military to train with American allies and upgrade its defense capabilities to respond in times of contingencies.

The fact that the strong alliance of the Philippines and the US is the strategic policy lynchpin of Philippine security is enough to occupy a central space in writing the country's national security strategy in the first quarter of the century.[70] But military alliance and defense

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[70] Japan, with a non-military Self-Defense Force (SDF), relies significantly on the US for external defense—a strategy the Japanese is proud to underscore as the cornerstone of their national security. In Japan's NSS in 2013, next to strengthening its diplomatic influence and defense capabilities is building a stronger alliance with the US. The defense cooperation of a pacifist and non-militarized Asian nation with the powerful and nuclear-equipped Western country is the strategic approach that gives the former security and negotiating power. Despite constitutional constraints in holding a military force, following its defeat in the Second World War, Japan maintains a strategic culture that gives utmost value to external defense, maritime security, and international order.

The National Security Strategy of Japan in 2013 states that: "The Japan-US Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's security. For more than 60 years, it has played an indispensable role for peace and security in Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region." With this, the Japanese government seeks to ensure stable presence of US forces in Japan, and broaden defense cooperation with the US in a wide range of areas such as

cooperation must go hand in hand with the modernization and orientation of the Philippine military to territorial defense and maritime security. In modernizing the AFP, defense acquisitions, upgrade, and training must be aligned to the needs and demands of an externally-oriented AFP.

In a country where the "promotion of internal socio-political stability" is the first and foremost national security goal, the AFP is continuously being made to perform regular functions of public safety and community development in order "to win the hearts and minds of people" in the countryside. Government, whose threat perceptions are mainly internal and political, relies on this protracted if not perpetual security arrangement since the country's independence in 1946.

Unfortunately, the focus of the AFP on internal peace and security, which was enacted in a public safety law,[71] has kept in the peripheral view the strategic demands of Philippine territorial defense and maritime security. The continuous use of the military in internal security affairs has also held back the transformation of civilian public safety agencies as primary responsible for the functions delegated to the AFP. Specifically, these functions pertain to: the safety and welfare of citizens; the partnerships for development in communities; the protection of critical infrastructure; the fight against terrorism, insurgents, and organized crimes; the countering of radicalization and violent extremism; the critical response in times of emergencies, disasters, and epidemics; the safeguarding of our national borders; and, the promotion of internal peace and security in general. These are the functions that must eventually be transferred to an integrated system of Philippine public safety as only apt in a democratic society.

(3) ***Strengthening and Broadening the Philippine Public Safety System for Internal Peace and Security***. In this era of security complexes, non-traditional threats in the field of public safety and citizen security have become existential crises on a broad scale and thus matters of national security and even international security. These threats include terrorism and violent extremism; internal armed conflicts; illicit networks of transnational crimes (drugs, arms trade, smuggling, human trafficking, etc.); natural calamities and disastrous effects of climate change; pandemic outbreak of infectious diseases; cyber attacks; unabated migratory flows, breach in border security; violation of maritime laws; and failing states.

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ballistic missile defense (BMD), maritime affairs, outer space, and cyberspace, among others. [See Japan's National Security Strategy in 2013, pp. 7-8.]

[71]See Republic Act No. 8551 dated 25 February 1998 with the comprehensive title "An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police and for Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred and Seventy-Five Entitled, "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Re-organized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and For Other Purposes."

Apart from the traditional threats to state security, other threats to the lives and ways of life of citizens and to the normal functioning of society and government need to be taken as distinct strategic problems. The distinction is important in defining the roles and functions of the security forces that are tasked to address these kinds of threats.

One of the major threats to the safety of the citizens and the public which I want to discuss in this section is terrorism. Poor and ungoverned spaces in failing states breed radicalization, violent extremism, and acts of terrorism. The presence and perpetuation of illicit networks of criminal activities in internally-weak states threaten not only the public safety and the national sovereignty but also the security of neighboring countries.

In the complex security environment of this century, international terrorist organizations converge with transnational criminal organizations. Together they take advantage of weak judicial system, corrupt government, unprotected infrastructure, vulnerable societies, and aggrieved individuals in expanding terrorists' influence in the world.[72] This is the reason why terrorism becomes a threat to international security and a major concern in national security strategies of affected countries.

In developed, as well as in developing countries, on the other hand, social grievances of marginalized individuals fuel radicalization that, if unabated, can turn to violent extremism.[73] Under this condition, the protection of citizens from terrorism starts from prevention in the initial psychosocial stage of indoctrination, affiliation, engagement, recruitment, and commitment of susceptible sympathizers. This is where social institutions—from family to schools, government, and society—take part in countering radicalization especially of the youth.

The vulnerabilities of individuals, groups, cities, critical infrastructure, cyber networks, financial system, and national borders must be reduced by building and/or improving awareness and protective capabilities. Information gathering, intelligence work, cyber protection, inter-agency coordination, and international collaboration must be enhanced to counter and/or pre-empt acts of terrorism. The pursuit and prosecution of terrorists and other lawless elements by the police and the courts must be facilitated by an efficient criminal justice system and effective governance. When acts of terrorism happen, the public safety sector and/or system must be able to respond to crisis and emergencies, and restore affected areas to normalcy in no time. Moreover, the active participation and collaboration of citizens with public safety agencies in community policing, emergency response, and local governance is essential to ensure public safety and national resiliency.

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[72]Celina B. Realuyo, "The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat to U.S. National Security" (Perry Center Occasional Paper, National Defense University, 2015), p. 43.

[73] See Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research," Journal of Strategic Security Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2011).

On the whole, the Philippine public safety sector must be strengthened and broadened to effectively protect citizens and communities from non-traditional security threats within the country. The public safety domain is a civilian inter-agency, multi-sectoral, and whole-of-society approach in ensuring the safety of the Filipino people in the homeland. Strengthening and broadening public safety for internal peace and security is a strategic line of action that must be separate from modernizing the military for external defense.

In the National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 in the Philippines, the primordial national security goal to "Promote Internal Socio-Political Stability" lumps together the modernization of the military and the police under the policy of "Strengthening Institutions and Internal Mechanisms of Safeguarding Public Order and Security." The NSP states that the security forces must ensure the effective delivery of basic services, the protection of the natural resources, and the promotion of "economic reconstruction," whatever the latter means for the state forces. But while this non-traditional role is provided for the security sector, the legitimate use of force by uniformed and armed security forces of the state is not clear and defined as a matter of policy.[74]

Even the policy to "Launch a Holistic Program to Combat Terrorism" in the NSP does not spell out the roles of different state forces in the country. The policy to "Pursue Reforms in the Security Sector" does not also state the kind of transformations the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) need in accord with the international democratic norm of security sector reform (SSR). It must be recalled that the SSR is one of the four key elements in the NSP. However, the NSP fails to take into account that the real essence of SSR is demilitarizing public safety functions in democratic societies. This is aside from educating our security forces on the rule of law and public accountability as the focus in the NSP.[75]

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[74] [National Security Policy 2011-2016, pp. 24-28.]

The introductory paragraph of "Promot(ing) Internal Socio-Political Stability," which is the first and foremost national security goal in the NSP 2011-2016, states that: "The security sector shall assist in creating the enabling environment to win the hearts and minds of those with valid grievances and retain the allegiance of the rest of the citizenry."

As a sub-security goal, the following are written under the policy of "Strengthening Institutions and Internal Mechanisms to Safeguard Public Order and Security":

> Pursue real modernization and transformation efforts in both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). This should shore up the AFP's Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program and the PNP's Integrated Transformation Program (ITP). The military and the police must have to rebuild themselves as institutions by way of reorganizing (as to how units are organized and utilized), retooling (as to equipment, weaponry and facilities), and reorienting their approaches (as to values and even strategy) in order to be more responsive to the constantly changing policy and security environments.

> This includes the strengthening of the government's coordinative and integrative mechanisms (Security Council, Peace and Order Councils, Anti-Terrorism Council, etc) to synergize the capabilities of the various institutions in attaining a common goal. (Underline provided.)

[75] [Ibid.]

It must be noted that the SSR principle was precisely the rationale for making the constabulary and national police in the Philippines civilian in nature in 1990. The SSR is also one of the policy principles that guide the development of the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) as the premier school of governance for public safety leaders and managers in the PNP, the Bureau of Fire and Protection (BFP), the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), and other unformed agencies outside of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).[76]

Considering the current security realities in the strategic field, the AFP cannot be made to act as a constabulary for a protracted period ever since the existence of the Philippine Republic. The internal preoccupation with counter-insurgency and peace-building of the AFP has for so long derailed its development into a capable and credible force for territorial defense, maritime security, and defense diplomacy. Notwithstanding the perpetual presence of the military in conflict-prone provinces in different regions of the country, the internal security condition has not developed to a state where the military can already transfer the primary responsibility of countering insurgency and terrorism, as well as peace-keeping, to PNP and other civilian agencies. To note, even the enforcement of maritime laws is a civilian function that normally belongs to the coast guard, and not to the navy—whose employment by a state could send an adverse signal of conflict especially in contested zones of the South China Sea.

The functions of public safety and internal security are certainly greater than the job of the PNP and of the DILG. But more than the use of the AFP, which has become a convenient course of action for government, the broadening of the Philippine public safety as a civilian policy regime must be in place in crafting the national security strategy (NSS) in the next administration. Beyond the scope of the interior and local governments, public safety or

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Under the policy to "Pursue Reforms in the Security Sector," the following are the only description given in the NSP:

> The government is committed in pursuing the transformation of the security sector that requires the adoption of policies, reforming institutions, and formulation and implementation of programs and projects that contribute to the following:
>
> ▪ Strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, to include reforms in the defense and law enforcement agencies, enhancing the oversight function of the legislative branch, and capacitating the civilians in Government and civil society organizations to oversee the security sector.
>
> ▪ Professionalizing the security forces to include, among others the establishment of programs designed to train the soldiers, police and other security sector personnel on their respective functions and responsibilities under the constitution or as provided for by law, and develop competencies on human rights, international humanitarian law, ethnic sensitivity and indigenous peoples' rights, in accordance with the rule of law. (Underline provided.)

[76] See Ricardo F. De Leon, "The Processes of Democratization in Developing and Newly Industrialized Countries and its Impact on the Further Education of Public Safety Officers in the Philippines," The Philippine Public Safety Review Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 2015), pp. 1-19.

citizen security is also the domain of criminal justice system, border control, coast guard, transportation and communications, immigration, customs, drug enforcement, and other civilian agencies.

The security of the Filipino people, their civil rights, properties, and way of life is a primordial national interest that is equal to the security of the state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional values. This is the real essence of the *Social Contract* Theory in the constitution of a country and a republic. That is, in creating a state—which citizens pledge allegiance to, and whose laws they agree to follow—government in exchange has the duty to provide for the security, safety, and order in society.[77] In theory, the Social Contract enables citizens to live in peace, harmony, and prosperity in a rules-based society. It allows citizens to develop their full potentials and aspirations in a social-institutionalist system that is constructed to be stable, predictable, and secure by the state.

Notably, the protection of the people, their way of living, and their homeland is the real Social Contract that applies in the national security policy and strategy of a state. This is quite different from the populist usage of Social Contract with a 16-point agenda in the NSP 2011-2016 which range from transformational leadership, poverty alleviation, job creation, reproductive health, food security, gender equality, OFWs' welfare; to good governance, judicial reform, and peace with the Moro rebels in the Mindanao, among other social objectives.

What appears to be lacking in the people-centered Social Contract in the NSP is an equal emphasis on the obligation, active participation, and shared responsibilities of the citizens in the grand task of securing their homeland against existential threats, such as terrorism and other massive disasters. I believe this patriotic duty and strategic culture of citizens to serve the community and the country is the anchor of a broadened policy on Philippine public security.

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[77] The Social Contract Theory is a classic Platonic philosophy that modern political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau propounded in Political Science discourses in the West. According to the Social Contract Theory:

> Prior to the establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the contract to embody a Sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust - anything goes. After these contracts are established, however, then society becomes possible, and people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to live well. Our choice is either to abide by the terms of the contract, or return to the State of Nature, which Hobbes argues no reasonable person could possibly prefer.

The quote above is taken from the peer-reviewed academic resource on the Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ For further reading on the subject, see Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

The idea of enlarging and strengthening public safety beyond the police and decentralized local governments at the center brings us to the thematic advocacy of homeland security. Propounded by the Philippine Public Safety College or PPSC, the home theme is strategically aligned to the security realities of the 21st century. This theme weaves through the different levels of security—from the individual, societal, and national to regional and international.

The resiliency and security of the homeland stands firmly on community policing, citizen collaboration, local empowerment, rule of law, good governance, public safety development, civilian security operations, and international cooperation. Unless this security regime is recognized for its non-military nature, we cannot come up with a national security strategy that takes stock of the nuances and idiosyncrasies of the non-traditional security threats that we face, and the strategic courses of action that we can take to effectively deal with such threats.

In light of the changing security landscape—where, traditionally, public safety is just a matter of law enforcement in local governments—the policy advocacy of the PPSC for an integrated security of the motherland and her people is right and ripe, timely and strategic. Broadening Philippine public safety to internal peace and security, similar to the homeland security framework of the US, is a multi-dimensional and collective strategy of safeguarding the citizens in the country. This internal security strategy is aimed at breaking illicit networks of organized crimes and terrorism; strengthening the rule of law and criminal justice system; fighting corruption and ensuring good governance; and empowering citizens to take part in this grand task.

(4)   Promoting Filipino Values and Universal Principles for National Resiliency, Diplomatic Influence, and Regional Stability. The promotion of national values provides moral suasion, sense of identification, and unifying force for the Filipino people to rally behind. Strong national values unite the country, move it forward to higher goals, and make it resilient to overcome challenges and calamities. In the pursuit of national security policy and strategy, the articulation of national values serves as a strategic communication of a country's identity and unity, interests and positions, as well as relations with other like-minded nations in the world.

Underlying the policy position on national and international security of a state are its national values which connect to those of other peoples and countries in the international community. The connection facilitates common thought-ways, interests, and security concerns that make strategic actors come together and cooperate to construct a favourable international political system. Their shared values also make them form alliances and/or coalitions against hostile forces or threats to their common interests. A clear articulation of national values is

therefore basic and strategic in a national security policy and strategy that we communicate to the region and the international audience.

National values are national interests that a state is bound to defend and protect by taking the necessary course of action. The Filipino national values are enshrined in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble lays down a high level of purposes and aims for which the Philippine Republic was established. To wit:

> We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy, under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain this Constitution. (Underline provided.)

The Preamble is a fundamental ideational foundation of national security policy and strategy making. The Preamble contains the referents of security which are: the people (the living); their posterity (future generation beyond the lifetime of the living); their sovereign government; their patrimony (national territory, estates, endowments, properties, etc.); and their time-honored values (democracy, rule of law, truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace). These values and principles guide policymakers in crafting a valid, viable, rational, and acceptable policy and strategy on national security.

In crafting a domestic security policy, such as the peace process with belligerent groups, political negotiators must not overplay and single out the value of peace as the sole guiding moral force, to the extent of sacrificing other compelling principles of truth, justice, and the rule of law. Peace without the other constitutional tenets creates a highly volatile and contentious internal security environment where law and order is sacrificed for short-term gains of a peace accord during a particular administrative period.

It must be noted that the national values in the Preamble refer to the higher order aspirations of the sovereign people of the present and future generations. With this, national values cannot just be interpreted or distorted to cater to the self-vested interests of those in power and/or by those on the other side of the camp.

In addition to the universal values stated in the Preamble, other principles and purposes that underpin state policies are as follows: democracy, participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, public safety, social contract, respect for human rights, sustainable development, etc. for governance; liberalization, free-trade, development diplomacy, globalization, etc., for economic growth; and sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, diplomacy, cooperation, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

freedom of navigation and overflight, code of conduct, and rules-based international order for national and global security.[78]

The external nature of a national security policy and strategy calls for firm, moral, and consistent national values which speak of the character and higher purpose of a nation-state as a foreign policy actor. This leads us to some rhetorical questions that we need to consider in promoting our national values to the world.

How do we as a Filipino nation want to be identified and recognized in the kind of values that we promote, courses of action that we take, commitments that we honor, and security relations that we foster with countries in the region? How does our practice of national values in the domestic society boost our identity, integrity, and resiliency as an effective state? How can we use this positive identity as leverage in our national security policy and diplomatic influence in the strategic setting? On the other hand, how does a departure from national values in a course of action that our government does or does not take affect our image in the domestic and international environments?

The National Security Policy or NSP 2011-2016 states in the introduction that this document "is a statement of principles that should guide national decision-making and determine courses of action to be taken in order to attain the state or condition wherein the national interests, the well-being of our people and institutions, and our sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected and enhanced." What the higher values and purposes are, nevertheless, seems to be lost in disconnected sets of principles and objectives that are presented in different parts of the NSP—from the four key elements issued by the President for the NSP, the Preamble, the eight provisions in the Constitution,[79] the seven elements of

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[78] For the US as a superpower, the guiding principle and purpose is world leadership in international politics and security—a strategic idea that had been clear since the birth of the American nation. Gordon Wood's thoughts in "The Idea of America" (2011) was quoted in an article on American values, interests, and purpose. According to him:

> . . . the Revolution . . . is the most important event in American history, bar none. Not only did the Revolution legally create the United States, but it infused into our culture all of our highest aspirations and noblest values. Our beliefs in liberty, equality, constitutionalism, and the well-being of ordinary people came out of the Revolutionary era. So too did our idea that we Americans are a special people with a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty and democracy. The Revolution, in short, gave birth to whatever sense of nationhood and national purpose we Americans have had.

[See Marybeth P. Ulrich, "American Values, Interests, and Purpose: Perspectives on the Roots of American Political and Strategic Culture" in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Security Issues: National Security Policy and Strategy Vol. II Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (USA: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2012), p. 3.]

[79] The National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 presents the following constitutional provisions under the Chapter on "Foundations of National Security:" (1) pursuit of an independent foreign policy based on national sovereignty and national interest; (2) definition of national territory consistent with new international covenants; (3) renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy; (4) freedom from nuclear weapons; (5) right to self--determination; (6) civilian supremacy over the military; (7) concept of a citizen army; and, (8) role of the armed forces as protector of the people and the State. [See National Security Policy 2011-2016, p. 2.]

national security, to the sixteen objectives of the Social Contract, and the exhaustive list of national security policy, goals, and objectives in the last Chapter of the NSP. What kind of national identity and security policy can thus be derived from the exhaustive presentations of various national values and principles in the NSP?

In the Chapter on "Strategic Context" in the NSP, following the Chapter on "Foundations of National Security," the characteristic identity of the Philippines is described in three ways: as a developing country, an "ASEAN Nation," and a country facing the challenges of governance. To note, the strategic identity of the Philippines as a maritime country in the security landscape is not mentioned and discussed.

Under the item of "Philippines: A Developing Country" in the NSP, the government's perception of its standing in the international community is somehow revealed. Also, the preference of the country to set aside its military (guns) for the sustenance of the basic needs of the people (butter) is made clear. As written in the NSP:

> Being a developing economy, it has not been easy for the Philippines to assert itself in the international community. Developed countries including newly developed ones such as China have already established themselves in international relations owing to their strategic weight. As such, highly industrialized and developed countries have great influence in the international community in a way that disputes are oftentimes resolved in their favor.
>
> In the "guns and butter" debate, "guns" have to give way to "butter" in the prioritization of resource allocation in the Philippines.[80] (Underline provided.)

Following the statements above is the description of the country as an "ASEAN Nation" whose hope for peace and security in the region is on the peaceful mechanism and non-confrontational stance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. As the NSP states:

> It is noted that greater ASEAN regional cooperation and partnership among member nations could further enhance regional stability and economic growth in the region. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) can therefore be viewed as a mechanism to pursue a better Southeast Asian picture: outward looking; living in peace, stability and prosperity; bonded together in partnership for dynamic development in a community of caring societies.[81]

It must be taken into account that other ASEAN member countries also have their own national interests to protect in the region, particularly over contested domains in the South

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[80] Ibid., p. 8.
[81] Ibid., p. 9.

China Sea (SCS), and that the ASEAN is not the venue to settle disputes and negotiate concessions with a powerful security actor that is China.

Lastly, the identity of the Philippines as a country facing the challenges of governance defines the primary focus of the NSP on internal socio-political stability—a goal that does not seem to be aligned with the title of the Chapter on "Strategic Context." As provided for in the NSP:

> For the Philippines, the challenge of governance is one of providing an <u>effective and responsive government</u> that serves the interests of the people. <u>Transparency, accountability and good governance would be its starting points</u>. It will also include developing and strengthening the organizational capability and capacity of institutions "in a sustainable way" to successfully institutionalize and implement reform measures. It also needs a <u>transformational leadership</u> committed to genuine reforms and leading by examples of integrity, patriotism, and love for the country. <u>The successful hurdling of the challenges to governance shall be the foundation by which socio-political stability as well as delivery of basic services, job creation, and pursuing security sector reforms will be established</u>.[82]

On the whole, the NSP propagates values and principles on good governance as "the starting points" of realizing the national security goals of socio-political stability, such as service delivery, job creation, and security sector reform or SSR. But while the "guns" of the military are de-prioritized in favour of the "butter" of socioeconomic development, the military personnel and their resources are channelled, as a matter of national security policy, towards governance and/or promotion of internal socio-political stability. Significantly, this is "the" policy direction of the four key elements of national security (governance, service delivery, economic reconstruction, and SSR) in the Message of the President in the NSP.

According to the NSP, the four key elements are directed at the most pressing threats to national security faced by government, which are: internal armed conflicts (communist insurgency and secessionist movement); terrorism; and weak institutions (partisan armed groups, criminality, graft and corruption, and poverty).[83] Hopefully, these internal security threats which are highlighted in the NSP will not be exaggerated and interpreted as the characteristic problems of a failing state—an identity that sends negative signals to other countries in the region.

The focus of the NSP on internal problems of governance implies a security trap where government deprioritizes the "guns" of national defense and security in a bid to securitize the "butter" or the socioeconomic goods and services promised by the administration. What significant gains, outcomes, and impact has this policy brought about in

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[82] Ibid., p. 10.
[83] Ibid., pp. 15-18.

bettering the internal security environment in 2016, the year the NSP of the current government administration expires?

Has the security policy of "giving way to 'butter' in the prioritization of resource allocations in the Philippines," as stated in the NSP, changed the state of internal socio-political stability as the primary focus of government? If the answer is yes, will the next Administration change this security policy in a move to attend to strategic matters of national security, such as modernizing the armed forces for external defense? If the answer is no to the question of whether the socio-political condition in the country has improved, will there still be a need for a national security strategy or NSS in continuing the things that government has been doing for convenience without a credible defense force of its own since the country's independence in 1946?

In another way, if the current internal security situation continues in the Philippines, and at the same time, the next administration also decides to change the security policy by crafting an NSS—how will this change the posture of our national defense and public security in this still new century? What kind of national values and principles, or a Filipino ideology, do we need to promote, cultivate, and educate our youth on in order to imbibe a strategic culture that will make us write a real NSS?

The promotion of national values and universal principles for national and international security may seem to be the easiest compared to the three strategic lines of action that I presented in this section. However, the propagation of Filipino values and international norms in a national security policy and strategy is not just an information campaign that can be worked out by ideologues and communication specialists. Rather, the national values are the country's culture and identity that are time and again reinforced through enduring practices and reliable actions which make that country credible, strong, resilient, and influential.

In diplomacy and security negotiation, the goodness of a country's intention and the moral values it is identified with is a powerful leverage that can get the support of other countries with common interests. This makes national values strategic, but also challenging in internally-differentiated domestic societies.

Conclusion

My theoretical discussions and rhetorical questions on the subject of national security policy and strategy are written in this journal as stand-alone essays on the fundamental areas and agendas that we need to focus on in this field. My academic inquiry was prompted by a perceived gap in the conceptual flow from policy to strategy in the National Security Policy 2011-2016 in the Philippines that had been published by government for the duration of a

presidential term. The epistemic question becomes a quest for a real national security strategy (NSS) for a state that needs to take an incisive look at its existential problems and act on these with political decisiveness, appropriate security measures, and strategic skills.

From the standpoint of *constructive realism*, I explored in this journal the conceptual foundations of policy and strategy and how they connect in real terms in a course of action by the state on matters of national security. I highlighted the premise that national security policy is socially constructed because of differing conceptions of security and perceptions of threats; but aside from this, I also underscored, more importantly, that national security policy is strategically oriented, because of its objectives, components, and nature of the environment in which it operates.

In particular, I discussed that national values define national identity and interests, the latter of which in turn determine national security policy and strategy. Given this logic, the core referents of a national security policy are the national interests which I identified in this paper as the following: the national sovereignty and territorial integrity; the safety of citizens—their lives, liberties, and properties; the economic lifeblood of the country; the critical infrastructure of a well-functioning state and society; the national values and constitutional principles; and, the peace and stability in the region and the international community. These are the kinds of interests that will endure in different political terms and will transcend parochial standpoints of elected policymakers. These are the national interests with a worldview and with strategic bridges to higher aims. These are the high-level interests that will guide us in making a real national security policy and strategy in these uncertain and volatile times.

What shapes Philippine interests and makes these the principled guide to action in a the national security policy is a function of *political culture* and *strategic culture*. In this journal, I explained that these cultural frames determine or influence how state and society think about security, perceive threats to their values and interests, and come up with policy preferences that conform to socially-accepted norms and behavior. I accentuated that political culture, along with strategic culture, is also a function of the kind of education that policy makers have about security and strategy, which can be seen in the logic and quality of a policy writing on national security. The open -mindedness and willingness of political authorities to learn about things that are new and/or not known are likewise a reflection of political and strategic culture or of the value given to critical thinking. When this seems to be a question, cognitive limitations spoil the development of strategic thought among policymakers and security administrators, whether or not the state has the capability and capacity to be strong.

Along this line, I explained in this journal how values and norms—as social constructions of peoples—influence the determination of strategy, particularly of the use of force and/or other powers of the state. Known as *strategic culture*, the socio-political preference for acceptable ways of executing a security policy is an important consideration in

formulating a national security strategy. Not only does strategic culture offer a critical analytical frame of introspecting our own values and biases, it also enables us to understand the mindsets of other strategic actors with whom we compete or negotiate on security.

Moreover, I underscored that a real national security policy is written using the correct strategic grammar and semiotic structure that can be learned from the discipline and discourse of this field. The policy writing is prefaced by educated concepts and frameworks that give logic, rigor, and coherence to an exposition of how the state views national security and proposes to act on this with a strategy. An NSS, which is introduced by a state policy on national security, contains the enduring national interests and higher aims, the existential threats against these, the courses of action to take, and the elements of national power to employ in order to advance and protect the country's core interests.

The relation between policy and strategy is the essential logic in the pursuit of national security by the state. Without a strategy that connects the objectives of policy to the required ways and means, a general aspiration for national security of a political leadership will remain non-operational and ineffectual. This condition is especially precarious in a country where real security threats penetrate its weak borders and complicate existing conflicts within. Under this security problematique, the want for a national security strategy cannot be met by a mere publication of a people-centered and development-oriented public policy of government within the term of the current administration.

As the next administration unfolds after the presidential elections in May 2016, it must face the security challenges as well as opportunities for the country with an NSS in the first quarter of this century. This is a primary responsibility that rests on the next President who must think and act beyond the commonly-known role as the Chief Executive of government. More than the mundane administration of departments and supervision of local governments, the President must effectively perform the strategic roles of the Chief of State, the Chief Architect of Foreign Policy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the state forces in formulating a suitable, viable, and acceptable NSS. National security, along with foreign policy, is where the President as a strategic state actor must concentrate on. The focus of the Chief of State on the strategic level is especially ideal in a system of governance that has already decentralized power from the center to the peripheries, and institutionalized citizens' participation in socioeconomic development and public policy process. Decentralization and political devolution will already allow the state to work on what really matters in national security and international relations.

In writing the NSS in the next period of political administration and beyond, I outlined in this paper four policy themes that I hope can get to the table of national security policy and strategy making. To reiterate, I presented the following strategic agenda: (1) boosting economic growth for citizens' welfare, national prosperity, and international competitiveness; (2) modernizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines for territorial defense and maritime

security; (3) strengthening and broadening the Philippine Public Safety for internal peace and security; and, (4) promoting Filipino values and universal principles for national resiliency, diplomatic influence, and regional stability.

It can be noted that the thematic lines above include the higher principles and purposes for which the courses of action are being sought. The themes are connected to different levels and referents of security—from the well-being and safety of citizens and their communities, to the defense and security of the country, and to the overall welfare and position of the nation--state in the community of other nations, that is Southeast Asia, as well as the larger Asia Pacific region.

The NSS must be written as a strategic communication that shall highlight, not the weaknesses of government and society, but the competitive advantages, power bases, resources, potentials, and spirit of the Filipino nation. I discussed in this journal that the elements of national power in the NSS of developed countries include a strong military, a robust economy and cutting edge technology, a compelling diplomacy, a reliable system of intelligence networks, a world-class knowledge base and intellectual capital, and a solid sense of national values and principles.

Furthermore, I asserted that the NSS must not sideline the crucial roles of the security forces of the state in national security. The state forces must be built up and strengthened to fulfil their mandates of securing the country, its citizens, their social institutions, and way of life. For the military, the mandate is to deter enemies, defend the country, as well as project a dignified symbol of our sovereign country to the world. For the public safety system, the responsibility is to protect the citizens and their communities, and to safeguard internal peace and security. If the modernization of the military, as well as that of the police and other civilian uniformed agencies, are sidetracked in the NSS—which by nature refers to the legitimate use of force or power projection—then a strategy on national security will simply lose its essence.

A country that does not have a real NSS bares the state of its military capability and economic capacity, as well as its political culture and strategic education. This condition reveals vulnerabilities and insecurities which we must overcome once and for all. The tasks at hand are great, and so we must begin by thinking about national security in a disciplined manner in order for us to act on real matters of national security in decisive ways.

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